Conkle Firm Attorneys Attend Cosmoprof Bologna to Assist Clients

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Conkle, Kremer & Engel attorneys John Conkle and Kelly Peterson have returned to Cosmoprof Worldwide Bologna to continue the firm’s longstanding practice assisting the growth and protection of personal care products businesses in U.S. and international markets.  Last year, Cosmoprof Bologna had nearly 3,000 exhibitors and 250,000 visitors in exhibition space totaling more than 160,000 square meters.  For over 50 years, Cosmoprof has been the benchmark event for companies and professionals in all sectors of the cosmetics industry, from supply chain to branding, marketing, distribution and sale of finished products.

Cosmoprof’s B2B format is well suited to connect businesses all over the world, and CK&E attorneys are experienced with what businesses in this sector need to succeed. CK&E lawyers have more than 40 years of experience with the legal issues affecting all stages of growth of personal care products businesses, from startup through acquisition. Issues such as domestic and international brand protection, regulatory compliance, contractual relations with distributors and vendors, customer relations, employment matters, partnership issues, sales representative issues, and insurance can be vexing to a growing business without the guidance of lawyers who have “been there and seen that” for decades.

On the first day of Cosmoprof Bologna, John and Kelly have already begun engaging with clients and prospective clients to help them navigate toward international growth. If you are a vendor there and have not talked with them yet, you can use the email addresses on their attorney pages to reach out to them for a consultation.

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California Employers: Do You Know When Your Furlough is a Discharge?

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To employers, it may seem like California regulates nearly everything about employment relations. Yet, surprisingly, statutes and courts in California never answered the question of when a temporary layoff becomes a “discharge” of furloughed employees. That is, until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did so recently in Hartstein v. Hyatt Corporation, 82 F.4th 825. The implications of this new ruling for California employers and employees are considerable.

Under the new ruling, any temporary layoff or furlough of employees without a specific return-to-work date within the employees’ regular pay period is considered a “discharge” under California Labor Code Section 201. That in turn triggers an immediate obligation for employers to pay all laid off employees all of the wages they have earned, including any pay owed for accrued vacation or Paid Time Off (“PTO”). Failure to pay in full all accrued wages, vacation and PTO when due runs the risk of substantial “waiting time penalties” under Labor Code Section 203. That can be a huge burden and risk for employers, as the Hartstein case demonstrated.

Hartstein arose during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, when many businesses were forced to greatly reduce or cease business operations without knowing when they would be able to reopen. In March 2020 Hyatt, like many employers, furloughed thousands of employees and was unable to provide any specific return-to-work date. Hyatt advised employees that vacation and PTO would not accrue during the temporary layoff, and Hyatt offered to pay any accrued vacation to employees upon request. A month later, in June 2020, Hyatt sent a letter advising employees that the temporary layoff had become permanent and employees would be paid their accrued vacation and PTO as required by Labor Code Section § 201 when a “discharge” occurs.

Hyatt employee Karen Hartstein filed a class-action and Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) lawsuit, arguing that a “discharge” had occurred with the indefinite temporary layoff in March 2020, and not when employees were permanently laid off in June 2020. The key question was whether a temporary layoff, lacking a specified return date, constituted a “discharge” under Labor Code Section 201, which had no definition of “discharge.” No previous published case had addressed the issue.

The Ninth Circuit turned to the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) for guidance in its previously-issued Opinion and its Policies and Interpretations Manual. DLSE had indicated that, when an employee is laid off without a specified return date within the regular pay period, the employer must immediately give the employee a final paycheck that includes vested vacation pay. DLSE reasoned that this interpretation best aligned with the statute’s purpose of protecting workers and ensuring prompt payment of earned wages.

The Ninth Circuit characterized Hyatt’s actions as “understandable given the uncertainty during the early period of the pandemic,” but remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Hyatt’s failure to issue full final paychecks in March 2020 constituted a “willful” violation, which would expose Hyatt to waiting time penalties. That question remains open and will be watched closely by employment lawyers.

Hartstein v. Hyatt provides new guidance to California employers who may need to implement open-ended furloughs or temporary shutdowns. This decision has made clear that California employers who furlough or temporarily lay off employees without specifying a return-to-work date within the same pay period should immediately issue final paychecks that include each employee’s vested and unused vacation or PTO.

Hartstein v. Hyatt demonstrates again that employment law in California is constantly evolving, and outcomes may not be as predictable as employers would hope. California employers facing such issues are well-advised to consult with qualified employment counsel to stay up-to-date on these and other important employment issues. Conkle, Kremer & Engel’s attorneys can help advise employers in navigating these complex and evolving issues.

 

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Are You Ready for the New California Employment Privacy Regulations?

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You may recall that the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) amendments (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 et seq.) went into effect January 1, 2023, but enforcement was delayed until March 29, 2024. Employers with the requisite contacts with California consumers (which is defined in an extremely broad manner) will be required to provide employees with extensive privacy notices, respond to requests to exercise new data rights, limit uses and disclosures of HR data, and obtain contractual commitments from third-party recipients of personal information.

The CPRA amendments apply to any business with worldwide gross annual revenue of $25 million or more that collects personal information from any California consumer, which includes a service provider, an employee, a job applicant or an investor, for example.  All entities that share common branding will be subject to the CPRA requirements if even one of those entities meet the requisite standards.

Generally, when the employer is subject to CPRA, its employees (and service providers, job applicants, investors, etc.) have six data rights:
1. The Right to Delete
2. The Right to Correct
3. The Right to Know
4. The Right to Restrict the Use of Sensitive Personal Information
5. The Right to Opt-Out of the Sale or Sharing of their Personal Information
6. The Right to Not Be Retaliated for Exercising these Rights

Each of these general rights are subject to detailed requirements and exceptions that must be carefully considered and addressed by employers, who must give appropriate notification to employees.  Employers’ data subject to the CPRA includes only information collected on or after January 1, 2022.  Given the suspended enforcement, it is presently uncertain whether employers will be expected to be in compliance through a “look back” period that could apply as early as the enactment date of January 1, 2023, or whether employers will be given a pass on compliance until the enforcement stay expires on March 29, 2024. In any event, employers who may be subject to the amended CPRA would be well advised to start their compliance efforts as soon as possible, and should contact qualified counsel to guide their efforts.

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Start at the End: Planning for Termination of Sales Representative Relationships

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Conkle, Kremer & Engel attorney Evan Pitchford recently published Start at the End: Planning for Termination of the Principal-Representative Relationship in the April 2023 edition of Agency Sales, the nationwide publication of the Manufacturers & Agents National Association (MANA).  Although no one likes to think about the potential end of a business relationship just when they finally succeeded in getting it off the ground, it is wise for sales representatives and principals alike to do just that.

Thoughtful preparation for the eventual termination of the sales representatives’ relationship will greatly improve the relationship throughout its existence, by making clear the terms that will apply as it comes to an end.  To understand their ongoing duties to each other, both parties should clearly understand the consequences of a termination under the various circumstances that may apply, such as a change by the principal to direct sales, contractual breaches, or just dissatisfaction of either side.  Specialized state statutes directed to sales representative contracts sometimes limit some of the termination provisions, but such statutes typically allow the parties to establish most or all of the terms for themselves.  It is definitely not wise for either side to just assume an applicable state statute will define what happens upon termination.

There are a great many options for termination provisions, including absolute cutoffs upon termination (which may be subject to “procuring cause” post-termination sales commission claims in some states), to timed durations of sales commission tails based on when the commission is considered earned, to phased termination extending commission tale periods based on longevity or achievement.  The only limits to the terms that can be agreed upon are the requirements of each state’s specialized sales commission statutes and the imagination and negotiating leverage of the parties.  Parties considering sales commission agreements are well-advised to seek the counsel of attorneys who are very familiar with sales representatives laws and practices, such as  attorneys at the Conkle firm.

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AB51, California’s Law Against Mandatory Employee Arbitration Agreements, is Invalidated

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California employers – especially those that required employees to sign arbitration agreements – have reason to celebrate. On February 15, 2023, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, (Case No. 20-15291) 2023 WL 2013326 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2023), ruled that AB 51, a California law effectively prohibiting and criminalizing mandatory arbitration provisions in employment agreements, is invalid because it is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

This development was not unexpected, as the U.S. Supreme Court has rendered a series of decisions supporting arbitration and striking down state laws prohibiting arbitration clauses in employment contracts as violations of the FAA. Yet despite this precedent, the California legislature has tried time and time again to enact anti-arbitration laws that creatively seek to avoid FAA preemption. AB 51 was the most recent attempt to circumvent the FAA.

AB 51 added California Labor Code Section 432.6, which prohibited employers from: (1) requiring employees to waive, as a condition of employment, the right to litigate certain claims in court; and (2) retaliating against applicants for employment or employees based on their refusal to waive such rights. Id. at (a) & (b). These two prohibitions by themselves would almost surely be preempted by the FAA but the California legislature sought to avoid that result by adding § 432.6(f), providing that nothing “in this section is intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is otherwise enforceable under the [FAA].” To give the statute teeth, AB 51 also amended other codes to impose civil and criminal liability on an employer who violates Labor Code Section 432.6. Together, these provisions had the strange effect of imposing criminal and civil liability on employers who enter into arbitration agreements that are valid and enforceable.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States filed a lawsuit seeking to declare that AB 51 was preempted by the FAA. In 2020, the trial court granted temporary injunctions against enforcement of AB51, because the court found that the Chamber of Commerce was likely to succeed in establishing that AB51 is preempted by the FAA. For that reason, employers did not feel the brunt of AB51 while the challenge made its way through appellate court.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (after some unusual twists, including a published decision that was later withdrawn by the Court) ultimately agreed with the trial court. The Ninth Circuit held that although AB 51 does not expressly prevent the formation of employment contracts containing an arbitration provision, it clearly disfavors the formation of arbitration agreements by placing civil and criminal liability on employers who require employees to sign arbitration agreements. That kind of penalty is an exception to generally applicable law that allows employers to require agreements, such as confidentiality agreements, as a condition of employment. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has held that “state rules that burden the formation of arbitration agreements stand as an obstacle to the FAA.” Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421, 1423 (2017). In addressing AB 51’s strange mechanism of imposing liability for the formation of valid contracts, the Court held that that “[a] state rule interferes with arbitration if it discriminates against arbitration on its face or if it covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that have the defining features of arbitration agreements.” Id. The Court held that “[b]ecause the FAA’s purpose is to further Congress’s policy of encouraging arbitration, and AB 51 stands as an obstacle to that purpose, AB 51 is preempted.” Id., at *10.

California employers should welcome this decision. The decision clarifies that businesses have broader freedom to contract as they see fit, and that it is permissible, even in California, to require employees to sign mandatory arbitration provisions as a condition of employment. The overall perception is that arbitration results in faster, less expensive resolution of employee-employer disputes, and keeps employment disputes out of California courts. Still, there are other schools of thought that believe that employment arbitrations can be more expensive for employers than the courts because private arbitrators often charge high hourly rates, the fees and costs of the arbitration must be advanced by employers, and dispositive motion victories (for example, a successful motion to dismiss a frivolous claim) are less common in arbitration. As well, even if arbitration is enforceable some employees may file their claims in court in the hope that the employer fails to take action to enforce arbitration.

Moreover, there are important limitations on employment arbitration agreements in California. In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000), the California Supreme Court held that employer-employee arbitration agreements may be “unconscionable” and unenforceable if they do not include provisions for: (1) a neutral arbitrator; (2) all remedies allowed under statutes; (3) adequate discovery procedures; (4) a written and well-reasoned arbitration decision; and (5) the employer’s payment of all costs unique to the arbitration process itself.

It is predictable that the same labor groups that supported AB 51 will continue to try to develop alternative measures to restrict employment arbitration agreements. Employers are well-advised to consult with well-qualified employment attorneys to stay on the right side of the rapidly changing laws. The attorneys at the Conkle firm stay abreast of developments and are well equipped to help your business navigate all aspects of wage & hour, discrimination, class actions, Private Attorney General (PAGA) claims and employment law, including the intersection of employment arbitration and litigation. Conkle, Kremer & Engel attorneys have many years of experience drafting arbitration provisions in conformance with California law and handling employment disputes—whether in arbitration or litigation.

Amanda Washton and Alec Pressly

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Changing Messages from Courts on AB 51: Now Employers Cannot Require Arbitration Agreements

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Note:  For updated developments on the long-running saga of AB 51, see our February 2023 blog post: “AB51, California’s Law Against Mandatory Employee Arbitration Agreements, is Invalidated”

For those employers who have been following the evolving history of Assembly Bill 51 (“AB 51”), which regulates California employers’ ability to have agreements to arbitrate any disputes with their prospective or hired employees, there is a new twist:  In a September 15, 2021 decision, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et al. v. Bonta, et al., Case No. 20-15291, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed a District Court decision to conclude that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) did not preempt California AB 51’s ban on employment conditioned upon mandatory arbitration agreements. As explained below, this Ninth Circuit ruling may soon have a substantial impact on employers’ arbitration policies going forward.

In 2019, California passed AB 51, which added section 432.6 to the California Labor Code and section 12953 to the California Government Code to generally prohibit employers from requiring applicants or employees to agree to arbitrate as a condition of employment. AB 51 made it illegal for an employer to require applicants or employees, as a condition of employment, continued employment, or the receipt of any employment-related benefit, to waive any rights, forum, or procedure established by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and the California Labor Code. The Conkle firm has written previously about the potential effects of AB 51.

AB 51 had been set to take effect on January 1, 2020, but on December 30, 2019, U.S. District Court Judge Kimberly Mueller issued a preliminary injunction, preventing AB51 from taking effect. Judge Mueller concluded that “AB 51 placed agreements to arbitrate on unequal footing with other contracts and also that it stood as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of the FAA.” Bonta, No. 20-15291 at 12. In other words, Judge Mueller decided that AB 51 discriminated against arbitration agreements in a manner that is prohibited by the superseding federal law of arbitrations, the FAA.

California appealed Judge Mueller’s ruling.  On September 15, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a split (2-1) decision partially reversing the District Court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not preempt AB 51 with respect to its prevention of conditioning employment on the signing of an arbitration agreement. On this basis, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction that had stopped AB 51’s enforcement, so at present there is nothing stopping AB 51 from taking effect very soon.

For employers, this means that, unless there are further decisions by the Ninth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court, AB 51’s mandate that employers cannot condition employment or continued employment on the signing of an arbitration agreement will shortly go into effect. However, employers should be aware that AB 51 does not apply retroactively, which means that arbitration agreements previously signed by employers before AB 51 can still be enforced.  ([Proposed] Labor Code §432(f).)

A common question Conkle, Kremer & Engel attorneys are receiving is whether, even under AB 51, an employer is allowed to request that employees or prospective employees sign an arbitration agreement. The answer is yes. However, because the Ninth Circuit’s decision is somewhat muddled on this point, there is no clear answer to the natural follow up question, “What can I do if the employee refuses?”

The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the enforcement provisions of AB 51 are preempted “to the extent that they apply to executed arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.” Bonta, No. 20-15291 at 29. The dissent in Bonta attacks the majority’s reasoning as illogical:

In case the effect of this novel holding is not clear, it means that if the employer offers an arbitration agreement to the prospective employee as a condition of employment, and the prospective employee executes the agreement, the employer may not be held civilly or criminally liable. But if the prospective employee refuses to sign, then the FAA does not preempt civil and criminal liability for the employer under AB 51’s provisions.

Bonta, No. 20-15291 at 47. As the dissent argues, the majority’s reasoning could result in liability to the employer where the employer fails while attempting to engage in the prohibited conduct of forcing an employee or prospective employee to sign an arbitration agreement, but the employer would not have liability when the employer succeeds in engaging in that same prohibited conduct.

What does this ultimately mean for employers? We expect the Ninth Circuit’s ruling to be challenged by a request for an en banc review by a larger panel of the Ninth Circuit’s justices, or by a writ to the U.S. Supreme Court (which has recently been quite hostile to Ninth Circuit rulings that it has chosen to review).  Such a challenge could result in yet another “stay” that would effectively restore the injunction issued by Judge Mueller and preclude AB 51 from taking effect. However, unless a stay is issued, AB 51 is set to go into effect in the near future.

While much uncertainty remains as a result of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, AB 51 will increase potential liability for employers that condition employment on arbitration agreements, as well as provide more power to employees who do not wish to arbitrate. Employers that currently have policies conditioning employment or continued employment on the signing of an arbitration agreement should continue to monitor the status of AB 51, should prepare for the possibility that it will not be able to require arbitration agreements going forward and should reevaluate the benefits and risks related to conditioning employment on the signing of an arbitration agreement.

CK&E attorneys keep updated on developments in the law that affect employers in California, including their rights to arbitrate disputes with applicants and employees.  Stay tuned for additional developments in this saga of AB 51.

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Can Employers Require Employees to be Vaccinated Against COVID-19?

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As we have discussed in previous Coronavirus-related blog posts, employers have a general duty to provide a safe and healthy workplace that is free from serious recognized hazards where possible (meaning that such hazards are either nonexistent, eliminated, or reduced to a safe or acceptable level).  While most regions have tiered or priority programs in which newly-released COVID-19 vaccines will only be made available to certain age groups or industry sectors after higher-risk individuals are vaccinated, as the vaccines are made more widely available, “essential” employers and employers who may be planning to resume or increase the scope of their on-premises operations may see vaccination as an important tool to ensure the maximum level of safety within their workplaces.

These employers likely have many questions about COVID-19 vaccines, such as whether they may be able to require employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 as a condition to being permitted at the workplace, how a vaccination program implicates disability and other related privacy issues and laws, and whether not requiring such vaccinations (or leaving it up to employees) could open them up to potential liability.

Addressing some of these concerns, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently released guidance for employers regarding workplace vaccine mandates (see Section K). While the EEOC guidance does not make any blanket rule regarding the permissibility of mandatory vaccinations, it does give recommendations on how an employer should navigate the various concerns that arise in administering a vaccination program.  (But be aware that state health departments may release guidance or rules different from the EEOC and that union workers in particular may have collective bargaining agreements containing particular rules that must be taken into account.)

Vaccines are not Medical Examinations Under the ADA, but Employers Should be Careful with Inquiries Surrounding a Vaccine

The EEOC guidance initially provides that the administration of Coronavirus vaccines is not considered a “medical examination” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), but that employers should be careful when posing any pre-screening vaccination questions to their employees that might implicate the ADA’s rules regarding inquiries which are likely to elicit information about an employee disability.  Any pre-screening questions (i.e. to determine whether there is a medical reason that would prevent the employee from receiving the vaccine) must be job-related and consistent with business necessity – an employer must have a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that an employee that does not answer pre-screening questions and does not receive the vaccine will pose a direct threat to the health or safety of herself or others.  Though the EEOC has previously stated that “based on the guidance of the CDC and public health authorities […] the COVID-19 pandemic meets the direct threat standard,” this assessment may change moving forward, and an employer’s response to the “direct threat” concern will likely differ depending on industry and other workplace contexts.  In workplaces with significant worker density or customer contact, the threat is generally considered greater than in workplaces with limited interpersonal contact or the ability to work from home.  Under the guidance, these concerns apply equally to requests for an employee to show proof of a COVID-19 vaccine – the request by itself is not a disability-related inquiry, but any questions asking for reasons for not obtaining a vaccine may be.

The guidance identifies two circumstances in which disability-related screening questions can be asked of employees without needing to satisfy the “job-related and consistent with business necessity” requirement.  First, if the vaccination program is voluntary rather than mandatory, an employee’s decision to answer screening questions is also voluntary.  In such case, if an employee declines to answer screening questions an employer can decline to administer the vaccine, but the employer cannot retaliate against that employee in any manner for her decision.  The second circumstance is when employees receive an employer-required vaccination from a third party not under contract with the employer, such as a pharmacy.  However, the guidance cautions that any employee medical information obtained in the course of a vaccination program must be kept confidential by the employer, and that employers should advise employees not to provide medical information to the employer when providing proof of vaccination.

If an Employee Cannot Receive the Vaccine due to Disability or Religious Belief, Employers Must Try to Make Accomodations Where Feasible

Per the guidance, if an employee indicates that she is unable to receive a COVID-19 vaccination because of a disability, employers must conduct an individualized assessment of four factors in determining whether there is a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace – the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm.  An employer cannot exclude an unvaccinated employee from the workplace unless there is no way to provide a reasonable accommodation to that employee that will eliminate or satisfactorily reduce the threat without undue hardship to the employer.  If such a threat cannot be reduced to an acceptable level, the employer can forbid the employee’s physical presence at the workplace.  However, this does not mean the employer may automatically terminate the employee – in some cases, the employee may be able to work remotely or may be eligible to take leave under various Coronavirus-related legislation, state law, or the employer’s own policies.  Employers should be sensitive to accommodation requests by employees and should engage in an interactive process that takes into account the nature of the industry, the employee’s role, CDC or other health official guidance regarding the current prevalence and severity of Coronavirus outbreaks, and whether an accommodation poses significant expense or difficulty to the employer.

The same standards and practices apply if an employee’s sincerely held religious belief prevents the employee from receiving the vaccine – while an employer should assume that a professed belief is sincerely held, if there is an objective basis for questioning the claimed belief, the employer may be justified in requesting additional information.

Further, the guidance refers to FDA literature providing that particularly because the COVID-19 vaccine is available under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) instead of traditional FDA approval, any person may opt out of receiving the vaccine.  As such, even if it is unclear whether disability or religious concerns motivate an employee’s decision to decline a vaccine, an employer should still likely make whatever reasonable accommodations are possible based on individualized assessments of the four factors described above.

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) is not Implicated by Employer Administration of a Coronavirus Vaccine

The guidance provides that because the COVID-19 vaccines, even though they use mRNA technology, do not involve the use of genetic information to make employment decisions or require the employer’s acquisition or the employee’s disclosure of employees’ genetic information.  However, as with disability concerns, employers should be careful to avoid pre-screening questions that specifically seek to obtain “genetic information” about their employees, which can include information about family medical history.

Practical Impacts for Employers Based on the Guidance

Based on the foregoing, employers, depending on the industry and the threat that unvaccinated workers may pose in a particular workplace, may find it easier to encourage but not necessarily require Coronavirus vaccinations, and, if vaccinations are required, employers may find it easier to have employees obtain the vaccines from third parties rather than the employer administering the vaccines.  Employers who do decide to create a vaccination program should create a thoughtful, formal process that both demonstrates reasonable efforts to maintain a workplace free of “direct threats” given the context of the business and takes the various health and privacy-related laws into account.  Protocols should be well-documented, including pre-screening questions and opt-out situations but, again, documentation must be held confidentially and employee inquiries should be narrow.  In some industries (for example, the California health care industry), employers are required to offer certain vaccines to their employees free of charge (and to provide technical information to employees regarding the vaccine itself), though it is unclear whether that requirement would be expanded to all California employers with respect to the COVID-19 vaccine.

An employer with employees who decline to take the vaccine may wish to have those employees sign a statement acknowledging the risks to that employee in making that decision, similar to the declination statement required in health care workplaces in California, and/or a liability waiver.  The employer may also want to post prominent signage or bulletins in its workplace regarding its Coronavirus protocols (which is already required in many instances) that includes some manner of information about the business’ vaccination policy in order to allow customers and others who enter the premises to be informed.  While such documentation may not eliminate liability, it may help to reduce it.

As always, the law surrounding Coronavirus issues in the workplace is constantly evolving.  The foregoing is not intended to be an exhaustive representation of federal, state, and local laws and directives regarding COVID-19, but is rather general information about some of the EEOC’s latest positions and how employers might be able to utilize those positions in the context of the particulars of their own workplaces.  Employers should always consult with the experienced attorneys before taking steps to implement a vaccination policy.  Conkle, Kremer & Engel attorneys stay up to date and are ready to help employers understand and implement practices regarding the Coronavirus vaccine in their  particular workplace circumstances.

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Conkle Firm Q&A About Coronavirus Effects in Beauty Industry Report

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Conkle, Kremer & Engel attorney Eric Engel appeared in a recent Q&A concerning COVID-19’s effects and predictions for the personal care products business in Beauty Industry Report COVID-19 Special Report. Readers were reminded that, as they adapt and plan, they must remember and respect the classic issues such as correct labor and employment practices that are not changed by the crisis. If anything, the contract and labor disruptions of the emergency conditions will exaggerate those issues if they are forgotten in the rush to adapt and reopen business.

CK&E attorneys stay current on developments in the coronavirus pandemic, while being watchful for the kinds of issues that can undermine clients, to help clients adapt and thrive in challenging business environments.

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LGBTQ Discrimination is Now Prohibited Nationally, but California was Ahead of the Trend

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As headlines across the country have blared, on June 15, 2020 in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that firing an individual for being homosexual or transgender is unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964. But this rule is nothing new in California, which has long prohibited employment and housing discrimination on the basis of an individual’s LGBTQ characteristics.

Title VII’s message is “simple but momentous”: An individual employee’s sex is “not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.” The statute’s message for our cases is equally simple and momentous: An individual’s homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions.

Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, U.S. Supreme Court

In bold and straightforward language the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bostock decision affirmed that any consideration of sex, homosexuality or transgender status in the course of adverse employment decisions is a violation of Title VII, even if there were other factors in the decision:

An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. It doesn’t matter if other factors besides the plaintiff ’s sex contributed to the decision. And it doesn’t matter if the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group. If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has occurred.

California’s equivalent rule is based on its Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which prevents employers from in any manner “discriminating” against persons based on their sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression or sexual orientation (among many other protected classes). While news stories about the Bostock decision emphasized hiring and firing decisions, “discrimination” can involve much broader employment concerns that involve consideration of prohibited classifications, such as:

  • – Transferring, demoting or taking other “adverse employment actions” with respect to an employee
  • – Paying an employee less than similarly situated employees
  • – Providing fewer or worse benefits to an employee than similarly situated employees
  • – Requiring additional conditions of employment for one employee compared to similarly situated employees

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision did not weaken California’s existing protections for gay and transgender individuals, but provides an additional source of protection for them. California employers should continue to actively prohibit and take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination in the workplace, and keep in mind that unlawful “discrimination” can encompass many types of adverse employment actions beyond hiring and firing decisions.

To guide our business clients, Conkle, Kremer & Engel attorneys stay updated on the latest developments in employment law, including anti-discrimination and wage & hour concerns.

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U.S. Dept. of Labor Publishes FAQ Guidelines for FFCRA

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We recently posted about the U.S. Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), including its most important components, the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act and the Emergency Medical Leave Expansion Act. As with most of the major new enactments intended to address COVID-19 issues, there was so little lead time that widespread confusion followed. The U.S. government has provided updates and guidelines to try to clarify the application of the FFCRA.

Most recently, the Department of Labor (DOL) has provided a “FAQ” response with more specific guidance to employers about how to comply with the FFCRA. These are some of the most important takeaways for employers:

  1. The DOL cleared up ambiguity surrounding whether state and local “stay at home” orders are considered a “quarantine or isolation order” for purposes of qualifying for EPSL under the FFCRA. The DOL guidance provides that a quarantine or isolation order includes a broad range of governmental orders including orders that “advise some or all citizens to shelter in place, stay at home, quarantine, or otherwise restrict their own mobility.” However, the government order must be the “but for” cause of the inability to work. An employee subject to one of these orders may not take paid sick leave where the employer does not have work for the employee, such as due to a downturn in business related to COVID-19, because the employee would be unable to work even if he or she were not required to comply with the quarantine or isolation order.
  2. Employees are not entitled to take EPSL or Emergency Family and Medical Leave (EFML) if their employer’s business has been forced to shut down in response to a federal, state or local government directive.
  3. If an employee takes EFML, an employer may require that the employee concurrently use any leave offered under the employer’s policies that would be available for the employee to take to care for his or her child, such as vacation, personal leave, or paid time off. No such provision exists with respect to EPSL.
  4. The DOL also provided additional guidance on the specific factors a small employer, with fewer than 50 employees, must show to receive an exemption from the requirement to provide leave under the FFCRA, when doing so would “jeopardize the viability of the business as a going concern.”
  5. Employers whose employees are teleworking should bear in mind that they are still required to comply with labor laws. Employees who are teleworking for COVID-19 related reasons must always record, and be compensated for, all hours worked, including overtime.
  6. An employee’s “regular rate of pay” as that phrase is defined under the Fair Labor Standards Act is used to determine the amount an employer must pay an eligible employee who takes EPSL or EFML (after the initial two-week unpaid period). Employers need to ensure they are accurately calculating employees’ regular rate of pay when compensating employees for paid leave.

The DOL’s FAQs, available here, provide needed guidance to help employers interpret and comply with the FFCRA. Conkle, Kremer & Engel attorneys continue to monitor and advise clients about the legal events affecting businesses trying to manage the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

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