Big Beer, Craft Beer, and Trademark Infringement: Harm to Premium Brands

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As the craft beer market continues to expand in popularity and threaten the market share of older “macrobrewery” giants like Molson Coors and Anheuser Busch, courts have seen increased legal disputes in the beer industry as brands fight for both their independence and the attention of consumers.  Most recently, Molson Coors has been sued in federal court in San Diego by Stone Brewing Co., one of the oldest and largest independent craft brewers in the United States.  In its complaint, Stone Brewing claims that Coors is infringing the “STONE” trademark by rebranding Coors’ sub-premium, low cost “Keystone” brand as “KeySTONE,” with a particular emphasis on the single word “STONE” in packaging and marketing materials.  Because of this, Stone Brewing alleges, Coors is sowing consumer confusion between the two brands.

Keystone Rebranding Comparison from Stone Complaint

Unless there is a swift settlement, one can assume that Stone Brewing will make good on the threat in its complaint that it will move for a preliminary injunction in order to stop the sale of Coors’ “KeySTONE” branded products during the pendency of the lawsuit.  A motion for a preliminary injunction is often a critical juncture in such trademark infringement lawsuits, and Stone Brewing will need to show that it will be “irreparably harmed” if the injunction is not granted.  This showing has in recent years become more difficult, as courts no longer presume irreparable harm when the plaintiff shows that consumers are likely to be confused by trademark infringement, but rather require an additional showing of likely irreparable harm.  “Irreparable harm” (also known as “irreparable injury”) generally means injuries that cannot be readily compensated by money damages, and since money damages are usually available for trademark infringement this standard presents special hurdles for infringement plaintiffs that can be difficult to overcome early in a case.

To show irreparable harm, one argument Stone Brewing will likely make is that its “premium brand” is being tarnished by confusion with Coors’ “value brand.”  This argument is presaged throughout Stone Brewing’s complaint (referring to Keystone’s beers as “watered down” and “fizzy yellow offerings,” as opposed to Stone Brewing’s “bold” and “artisanal” products).  The argument, which has been judicially adopted in relatively few cases, is essentially that the premium or niche brand is irreparably harmed by the association with the value, mass-market brand, which usually is of lesser quality.

Conkle, Kremer & Engel, which has experience in both trademark litigation and issues specific to beer production, distribution, and marketing, has succeeded in making this premium-vs.-value argument in federal courts in California.  For example, in Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Zotos International, Inc. (230 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (USDC C.D. Cal. 2017)), a 2017 trademark infringement case with similarities to the dispute between Coors and Stone Brewing, CK&E represented the manufacturer of Moroccanoil Treatment, a luxury oil-infused hair care product sold in distinctive packaging.  The defendant Zotos, part of a large personal care products conglomerate, had created a low-cost “value” hair oil product called “Majestic Oil” that, in addition to its similar name, used packaging that was a close likeness of Moroccanoil’s trade dress.

CK&E, in its successful motion for preliminary injunction, argued that sales of low-cost “value” Majestic Oil products would erode Moroccanoil’s carefully-built premium image.  The presentation included evidence establishing that once a product is no longer perceived by consumers as “premium,” it is difficult or even impossible for the seller to regain that perception.  The court agreed with CK&E and Moroccanoil, finding a likelihood of irreparable harm and granting a preliminary injunction against further sale of the Majestic Oil products.

Preliminary injunctions can be dramatic turning points in infringement cases.  In Moroccanoil’s case, the court’s preliminary injunction prevented Zotos from any further sales, advertisement or distribution of its infringing products, and required Zotos to recall all of its infringing products already in the market.  As could be predicted, the case settled swiftly thereafter and Zotos made permanent substantial changes to its product name and packaging to avoid infringing Moroccanoil’s intellectual property rights.

Click here to learn more about CK&E’s Moroccanoil v. Zotos matter or contact CK&E attorneys who work on beer industry matters, such as the brand protection that can make or break participants in the crowded craft beer market, including John Conkle, Evan Pitchford and Zachary Page.

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Spain Enjoins ISP from Allowing User to Infringe Copyrights

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The Barcelona Court of Appeal recently issued a judgment holding an Internet Service Provider (ISP) subject to injunction due to copyright infringement by one of its users.  This ruling is consistent with the EU’s Copyright Directive, Recital 59, which provides:

In the digital environment, in particular, the services of intermediaries may increasingly be used by third parties for infringing activities. In many cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring such infringing activities to an end. Therefore, without prejudice to any other sanctions and remedies available, rightholders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction against an intermediary who carries a third party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject-matter in a network.

Spain authorized injunctions against intermediaries in article 8(3) of its Copyright Act.

In the Barcelona case Promusicae, an association of Spanish music producers, learned that someone was using the Direct Connect P2P network to make available in a shared folder 5,000 music files including copyrighted music.  In Spain, ISPs are not obligated to identify their users for purposes of civil lawsuits, so the only identification of the user available to the claimants was a nickname and IP address.

Without identifying the primary infringer, the copyright holders sued the ISP, R Cable y Telecomunicaciones Galicia.  The appellate court found that there was infringement and that the copyright holders were entitled to an injunction against the ISP that was providing internet access to the infringer, enabling the infringement.  The injunction required the ISP to permanently stop providing internet access to the infringing user, stopping the infringement.

This was the first ruling of its kind in Spain, but analogous rights against intermediaries are available in the U.S. and EU countries.  Conkle, Kremer & Engel assists its clients to protect and enforce their IP rights in copyrights, trademarks and patents worldwide.

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Prop. 65 Reform — Is a Safe Harbor from Bounty Hunters on the Horizon?

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California’s now-infamous Proposition 65 (Prop. 65, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.5) allows a private citizen to file a lawsuit against any business that fails to post adequate warnings about the presence of chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive harm.  The private enforcer may seek an injunction, penalties of up to $2500 per violation, per day, and an award of attorneys’ fees.

Assembly Member Mike Gatto (43rd District of California)  recently proposed legislation, Assembly Bill 227, that would reform Prop. 65 by providing a “safe harbor” in the form of a 14-day period for businesses to correct alleged violations.  If enacted as proposed, a business who receives a demand under Prop. 65 would have a brief opportunity to demonstrate its compliance with Prop. 65 requirements to the California State Attorney General, or the responsible city attorney or district attorney.  If the business takes advantage of that “safe harbor” then the claimant would be barred from filing a lawsuit against that business.

While the purpose of Prop. 65’s private enforcement provision is to allow private citizens to act on behalf of the public to ensure warnings are properly posted, supporters of AB 227 criticize Prop. 65 as a “bounty hunter” statute that primarily benefits plaintiff’s attorneys.  In 2011, businesses paid a total of nearly $16 million to settle lawsuits brought by  private citizens, of which almost $12 million was paid to the plaintiffs’ attorneys.  In fact, nearly half of the attorneys’ fees were paid to a single firm: The Chanler Group.

AB 227 would give businesses the opportunity to come into compliance with Prop. 65 warning requirements without paying exorbitant settlement fees to prevent costly litigation.  But businesses would have to take swift action.  As CK&E attorneys John A. Conkle, Amy Burke and Mark Riedel discussed in their November 2012 presentation to the Personal Care Products Council, What’s Your Game Plan?, it is important for businesses to develop strategies for ensuring regulatory compliance and for handling notices of violation quickly and efficiently.  AB 227, if signed into law, would be another reason that businesses should prepare contingency plans for the day that they receive a notice of violation from plaintiffs seeking to take advantage of Prop. 65 — a business could avoid being sued at all if it responds quickly and correctly to take advantage of the safe harbor.  CK&E advises clients in regulatory compliance, responding to warning and demand letters, and developing an individualized game plan to suit each client’s needs.

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Keeping "Competition" in California’s Unfair Competition Law

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California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) provides broad protections to both consumers and businesses, prohibiting any form of conduct that can be found to be an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.”  (California Business & Professions Code § 17200)  The UCL is particularly powerful because it can reach conduct that is not specifically illegal under any other law, and can also provide a remedy for any acts or omissions that are prohibited under other state or federal laws even if those laws do not allow private citizens to sue when they are violated.  A recent example is the case of Law Offices of Mathew Higbee v. Expungement Assistance Services, in which a lawyer used the UCL to sue a credit repair service that was not licensed to practice law. The lawyer alleged that he too was in the credit repair business and, as a result of the defendant’s violations of California’s attorney licensing requirements,  the competing lawyer was required to lower his prices and spend more money on advertising, lost clients and revenue, and the value of his law firm had diminished. Ordinarily, the statutes requiring a license to practice law cannot be enforced by private citizens. But here, the UCL was held to “borrow” the statutory violation to show an “unlawful business act or practice” that gave the plaintiff a claim.

Those already familiar with UCL know that it was modified by Proposition 64 in 2004, tightening the standing requirements so that an action could only be brought by a “person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property” as a result of the alleged unfair competition. (B&PC section 17204)  Some courts had struggled with this new requirement, at times suggesting that the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant had directly taken money from the plaintiff as a result of the unfair competition.  Such a requirement would effectively eliminate “competition” out of the Unfair Competition Law:  It is rare that a business competitor could show that it gave money or property directly to a competitor as a result of unfair competition – and if it did happen, the plaintiff would probably have a breach of contract or fraud claim and probably would not need to use the UCL.

But over time it has become clear that Prop 64 did not not eliminate unfair competition claims between competitors.  In the Law Offices of Mathew Higbee case, the Court of Appeal in Orange County held that the UCL does not require that the parties have had direct dealings with each other in order to succeed “in alleging at least an identifiable trifle of injury as necessary for standing under UCL.”  The Court surveyed the law before and after Prop 64, and found the cases supportive of a rule that permitted business competitors to make unfair competition claims.  The standing requirement does not require in every instance that the parties have had direct dealings with each other. The Court emphasized that, provided that the “identifiable trifle of injury” resulting from the acts of unfair competition can be shown, “the UCL does not leave the court hamstrung, unable to even consider an action seeking injunctive relief just because the defendant engages in its purportedly unlawful activity via the Internet and has not had any direct business dealings with the plaintiff.”

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